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Hedge Funds: Risk and Return 




  Constructing a data base that is relatively free of bias, this paper provides measures of the 
returns of hedge funds as well as the distinctly non-normal characteristics of the data.  We 
provide risk-adjusted measures of performance as well as tests of the degree to which hedge 
funds live up to their claim of market neutrality.  We also examine the substantial attrition of 
hedge funds and analyze the determinants of hedge fund survival as well as perform tests of 
return persistence.  Finally, we examine the claims of the managers of “funds of funds” that they 
can form portfolios of “the best” hedge funds and that such funds provide useful instruments for 
individual investors.  We conclude that hedge funds are far riskier and provide much lower 
returns than is commonly supposed. 
     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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  Hedge funds have become an increasingly popular asset class during the 1990s and early 
2000s.  Amounts invested in global hedge funds have risen from approximately $50 billion in 
1990 to approximately $1 trillion by the end of 2004.  Because these funds characteristically 
employ substantial leverage, they play a far more important role in global securities markets than 
the size of their net assets indicates.  Market makers on the floor of the New York Stock 
Exchange have estimated that during 2004, trades by hedge funds have often accounted for more 
than half of the total daily number of shares changing hands.  Moreover, investments in hedge 
funds have become an important part of the asset mix of institutions and even wealthy individual 
investors. 
  In this paper, we will first examine the characteristics of the hedge fund universe and the 
claims made by hedge fund managers regarding their performance over time.  We then carefully 
examine the data bases that have been used to measure hedge fund performance and estimate the 
magnitude of two substantial biases in the data series.  We shall see that these biases are far 
greater than has been estimated in previous studies. 
  Constructing a data base that is relatively free of bias, this paper examines the returns of 
hedge funds as well as the distinctly non-normal characteristics of their returns.  We provide 
risk-adjusted measures of performance as well as tests of the degree to which hedge funds live up 
to their claim of market neutrality.  We also examine the substantial attrition of hedge funds and 
analyze the determinants of hedge fund survival as well as perform tests of return persistence.  
Finally, we examine the claims of the managers of “funds of funds” that they can form portfolios 
of “the best” hedge funds and that such funds provide useful instruments for individual investors. 
     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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[Insert Exhibit 1:  Growth of Hedge Fund Assets] 
 
 
Characteristics of Hedge Funds 
  The term “hedge fund” is applied to a heterogeneous group of investment funds.  To the 
extent that they share any common characteristic it is that, unlike the typical equity mutual fund, 
they tend to employ substantial leverage, they usually hold both long and short positions, and 
they often employ complex investment instruments such as derivative securities in their 
portfolios.  Exhibit 2 shows the distribution of hedge fund types according to the TASS database, 
which we use in this study and which will be fully described below. While these style 
classifications are largely based on hedge fund managers’ reports to TASS, Brown and 
Goetzmann (2001) determine on the basis of a generalized least squares procedure that “self-
classifications […] are indeed reasonably descriptive of TASS hedge fund styles.” 
  The largest group of hedge funds is categorized as Long/Short.  These funds have 
substantial short positions or they employ derivatives to hedge the market risk of their long 
positions.  Some funds in this group explicitly attempt to be “Equity Market Neutral,” i.e., to 
achieve positive returns irrespective of general market movements.  Arbitrage strategies aim to 
exploit mispricings of securities (such as improper relative valuations of convertible bonds and 
the underlying stocks and bonds) or unusual spreads between the interest rates of various fixed-
income securities.  These types of funds make heavy use of statistical and mathematical models 
in an attempt to capture market inefficiencies.  Event Driven funds try to capture gains from 
corporate restructurings or from mergers and acquisitions.  Directional strategies are employed 
by Global Macro, Emerging Markets, Dedicated Short Bias, and Managed Futures funds.  These     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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strategies will attempt to profit from short-term momentum in currency, equity, bond, or 
commodity price movements and funds following these strategies often describe themselves as 
trend followers.  The Fund of Funds category encompasses managed portfolios of hedge funds 
that attempt to provide investors with a diversified vehicle intended to match or exceed the 
industry benchmark.  These funds are heavily marketed to high net worth individuals. 
  One further aspect of the hedge fund industry deserves mention:  hedge fund managers 
are highly compensated.  A typical fee arrangement in the industry is to compensate the manager 
by paying 2 percent of the assets under management plus 20 percent of any profits that are 
earned.  In contrast, the typical mutual fund management fee amounts to 1 ½  percent of the 
assets or less.  Performance incentive fees are not common for mutual fund portfolio managers. 
The Putative Case For Hedge Funds 
  An examination of the aggregate returns of hedge funds that are reported by the major 
data providers suggests that hedge funds have been a superb asset category during the late 1990s 
and early 2000s.  For example, data provided by Van Hedge Fund Advisors, shown in Exhibit 3, 
indicates that from 1998 through 2003, hedge funds appear to dominate other investment 
categories.  Exhibit 3 suggests that hedge funds have achieved generous returns and a low 
standard deviation of returns.  As a result, their Sharpe ratio dominates other asset classes such as 
stocks and bonds.  Data such as these convinced Lamm (1999) to entitle his study “Why Not 
100% Hedge Funds?”  Lamm suggested that a 100 percent allocation to hedge funds was optimal 
under certain conditions.  In addition, hedge funds claim that their returns have low correlations 
with the general equity market and, therefore, that they are excellent diversifiers. 
 
     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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[Insert Exhibit 2:  Categories of Hedge Funds] 
 
 
[Insert Exhibit 3:  Global Hedge Fund Net Returns 
January 1, 1988 – December 31, 2003]  
 
Biases in Reported Hedge Fund Returns 
  Several biases exist in the published indexes of hedge fund returns.  In this section, we 
describe these biases and provide measures of the most significant ones. 
1. End-of-Life Reporting Bias 
  Hedge funds generally stop reporting their results during the last several months of their 
lives.  For example, Long-Term Capital Management lost 92 percent of its capital between 
October 1997 and October 1998.  None of these negative returns were reported to the data base 
providers.  Posthuma and van der Sluis (2003) have estimated the bias by assuming that the 
hedge fund has a negative return in the month after it stopped reporting.  According to their 
calculations, the average industry hedge fund return would be reduced by over 600 basis points 
per annum if the non-reported last month return was negative 50 percent for funds leaving the 
data base.  This method of adjustment may well improve the accuracy of the various hedge fund 
indexes but we have chosen to avoid such ad hoc adjustments to the data for two reasons:  First, 
it is possible that some funds stopped reporting not because they failed, but because they did not 
want to attract new funds.  Indeed, Ackerman et al. (1999) argue that many funds with strong 
results stop reporting because they no longer require the services of a data vendor.  Second, we 
prefer to rely instead on adjustments that can be documented through the use of actual reported     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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results.  We need to recognize, however, that even our adjusted return data are likely to be biased 
upwards. 
2. Backfill Bias 
  Unlike the data for mutual funds, which must report to regulators and investors their 
periodic audited returns, hedge funds provide information to the data base publishers only if they 
desire to do so.  Managers often will establish a hedge fund with seed capital and begin reporting 
their results at some later date and only if the initial results are favorable.  Moreover, the most 
favorable of the early results are then “backfilled” into the data base along with reports of 
contemporaneous results.  Fortunately, data available from TASS Research, a unit of the hedge 
fund group Tremont Capital Management, indicate when the hedge fund began reporting.  
Hence, we can examine the backfilled returns and compare them with those returns that were 
contemporaneously reported.  The result should indicate the extent to which the backfilled 
returns are upwardly biased. 
  Exhibit 4 compares the yearly returns of the backfilled and contemporaneously reported 
(non-backfilled) returns as well as providing statistical tests of the differences between the two 
groups.  We note that in the early years (1994 through 1997) the vast majority of the reported 
returns were backfilled.  Only in later years (2001 and later) did the number of non-backfilled 
returns exceed the number that was backfilled.  The Exhibit shows that backfilled returns tend to 




                                                                 
1 The analysis has been done filling in some data when only partial years were reported.  When partial year data 
were the only data available, we filled in the missing partial years by assuming that the fund earned the monthly 
average of all reporting hedge funds during the missing month.  Thus, if we had data available from March through 
December, we used the average hedge fund return from January and February to calculate an annual return for that 
fund.       Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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[Insert Exhibit 4:  Backfill Bias in Hedge Funds Returns 1994 – 2003] 
 
 On average, the backfilled returns are over 500 basis points higher than the contemporaneously 
reported returns.  Using both a test of the difference between the means and medians, we find 
that the difference between the backfilled and non-backfilled returns is highly significant.
2  The 
use of backfilled returns to judge the effectiveness of hedge fund management significantly 
biases the returns upwards. 
3. Survivorship Bias 
  Another important bias in the published hedge fund return indexes is that imparted by 
survivorship bias.  Data bases available at any point in time tend to reflect the returns earned by 
currently existing hedge funds.  They do not include the returns from hedge funds that existed at 
some time in the past but are presently not in existence or do still exist but no longer report their 
results.  As we shall see below, unsuccessful hedge funds do not tend to survive.  It is difficult to 
obtain new assets for the fund if performance has been poor.  Hence, unsuccessful funds tend to 
close, leaving only the more successful funds in the data base.
3 
  In order to examine this phenomenon, we obtained from the TASS reporting service all 
the past records of funds that are defunct (or for any other reason have stopped reporting) as of 
April 2004.  We refer to these as “dead” funds.  Funds that continued to report in 2004 are 
classified as “live” funds.  A comparison of the returns from “live” and “dead” funds is shown in 
Exhibit 5.  The analysis is performed without any backfilled data, which we have shown is 
substantially upwardly biased. 
                                                                 
2 Only the test for differences between mean returns is reported in Exhibit 4. 
3 As indicated above, it is possible that some hedge funds stopped reporting, not because they were unsuccessful but 
rather because they did not want to attract new funds.  We will examine this possibility below.     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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  Exhibit 5 shows that each year there is a substantial difference between the returns of live 
and dead hedge funds.
4  Moreover, the data show that there is a substantial attrition rate for 
hedge funds.  For example, there were 604 hedge funds that reported contemporaneous data in 
1996.  Of those funds, less than 25 percent (124 funds) were still in existence in 2004.  
Moreover, the mean return for the live funds substantially exceeded the returns from the dead 
funds.  Over the entire 1996 through 2003 period, the average difference between the two groups 
of hedge funds was almost 750 basis points.  In each year, the differences in the two means were 
highly significant.
5   
  It is reasonable to assume that the performance of all hedge funds (both the survivors and 
the nonsurvivors) is the best reflection of the performance of the hedge fund industry as a whole.  
We see from the bottom panel of Exhibit 5 that the (arithmetic) average return of the surviving 
funds was 13.50 percent over the 1996-2003 period.  The average return for all funds was only 
9.71 percent—a 379 basis point difference.  A comparison between our results and the returns 
published by three index providers, CSFB/Tremont, Van Hedge Advisors, and HFR, is shown in 
Exhibit 6.  The high returns shown by the three index providers most nearly correspond  
 
 [Insert Exhibit 5] 
 
                                                                 
4 Data for 1994 and 1995 were excluded from the analysis because almost all of these data were backfilled rather 
than contemporaneously reported. 
5 One other aspect of survivorship deserves mention.  Suppose a hedge fund with an initial value of $100 increases 
in value by 10 percent in one year (after payment of management and incentive fees) to $110.  During the next year, 
assume the fund declines by about 10 percent to $100.  In year three, assume that it rises to $110.  In this case, the 
manager would not earn another incentive fee for year three’s profit.  Incentive fees would be payable only on the 
amount of any increase in the market value of the fund over $110.  The $110 figure is referred to as a “high water 
mark.”  This explains why there is so much attrition in the industry.  If a fund falls sharply so that its asset value is 
well below its high water mark, the fund manager will be incented to close the fund and open a new one on which 
any increase in asset value will earn an incentive fee.  Moreover, Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001) find that 
managers who perform poorly in the first half of a calendar year tend to increase the volatility of the portfolio in the 
second half of the year.  The strategy appears to be that the manager tends to “roll the dice” in an attempt to exceed 
the high water mark.  If they fail to do so, they disband the fund.     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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[Insert Exhibit 6] 
 
to our results from the TASS data base when only surviving funds are considered and when 
backfilled returns are included in the analysis.  We conclude that despite the claims that they are 
bias free, the popular hedge fund return indexes are substantially biased upward.  Moreover, after 
correcting for these biases, hedge fund returns appear to be lower than the returns from popular 
equity indexes and look very similar to the mutual fund returns reported in Exhibit 3 above.  
During the period spanned by the chart, the S&P 500 stock index earned an average compound 
annual return of 12.3 percent, slightly higher than the equivalent figure for the backfill-included 
hedge fund universe. 
  One possible explanation for the differences in results could be that the comparison 
hedge fund indexes may be asset weighted rather than equal weighted.  All of our averages are 
equal weighted rather than size weighted, since asset values are available in the TASS data base 
for only about one half of the funds covered.  It is, of course possible, however, that larger funds 
do better than smaller ones and that by equal weighting we are biasing the industry averages 
downward.  In fact, however, only the CSFB index reported in Exhibit 6 is asset weighted.  Both 
the Van Hedge and HFR indexes are equal weighted.  Thus, the weighting convention employed 
cannot be responsible for our lower estimated returns. 
  We can, however, examine the effects of weighting on the results.  We are able to 
calculate differences between equal weighted and asset weighted returns for the funds for which 
asset data exist.  From 1996 through 2003, equal weighted returns for those hedge funds 
reporting assets were 9.33 percent per year.  The equivalent asset weighted return for those funds 
was 9.75 percent, 42 basis points higher.  Thus, there is a tendency in our data set for larger     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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funds to outperform smaller ones.  But this analysis suggests that even with asset weighting, the 
conclusions of this paper would still hold.  Moreover, there is essentially no difference in the 
equal weighted returns of those funds in our sample with and without assets.  Thus, there is no 
reason to believe that even if asset data were available for all funds, our conclusion would 
change. 
  It is interesting to compare our estimates of survivorship bias with data obtained from an 
analysis of mutual funds.  Malkiel (1995) found that mutual fund return data were significantly 
influenced by survivorship bias during the 1980s and early 1990s.  Exhibit 7 updates the results 
of that analysis using data from the same years for which we have data for the hedge funds 
universe.  While survivorship bias is present in both data series, the degree to which the returns 
from survivors (live funds) exceed those of non-survivors (dead funds) is far greater in the hedge 
fund universe.  The difference in returns comparing all mutual funds (live and dead) with only 
the surviving funds is 123 basis points compared with the difference of 374 basis points in the 
case of hedge funds. 
 
 
[Insert Exhibit 7:  Survivorship Bias in Mutual Funds 1996 – 2003] 
 
  In Exhibit 8, we show estimates of survivorship bias by hedge fund category.  We find 
substantial differences between live and dead funds in all categories.  Interesting, we also find 
substantial survivorship bias in the “Fund of Funds” category.  This contradicts the claim of 
Lamm (2003) that survivorship bias in the fund of funds category is relatively small.     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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  Our estimates of survivorship bias are considerably larger than those found by other 
investigators.  Measuring the bias as the difference between the returns of all hedge funds and 
only surviving funds, we find a bias averaging 374 basis points.  Estimates of survivor bias by 
Brown, Goetzman, and Ibbotsen (1999), Brown, Goetzman, and Park (2001), Liang (2000, 2001) 
and Fung and Hsieh range from 60 basis points to 360 basis points per year for various hedge 
fund types.  In a study covering data during years similar to ours, Amin and Kot (2003) estimate 
survivorship bias at levels about 200 basis points per year.  In a study covering a period prior to 
ours, Ackerman, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999) find estimates of survivorship bias that are 
small and insignificant. 
  We believe there are several reasons why our estimates of survivorship bias tend to be 
higher than those of previous investigators.  First, other investigators have used different data 
sets than we have employed.  Liang (2001) states that HFR (the data base provider for some of 
the previous studies) collects less information on dissolved funds than TASS.  Liang finds that 
his estimates of survivorship bias using the HFR data set are over 160 basis points lower than 
those found using the TASS data base.  Also, the U.S. Offshore Fund Universe data set, used by 
Brown et al. (1999), reports only annual returns and thus excludes data for funds that stopped 
reporting during the year, including those funds that died during their year of inception.  Even so, 
they found, on average, a 300 basis point difference between surviving funds and all funds, not 
too dissimilar to our own estimates.  Moreover, we estimate survivorship bias using only  
 
[Insert Exhibit 8:  Survivorship Bias by Primary Category 
1996-2003] 
 
     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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contemporaneously reported data rather than both contemporaneous and backfilled data.  In 
addition, we use a more recent period than other investigators and our sample size is 
substantially larger.  Finally, since data on “dead” funds are not easily available from the data 
gathering services, we were particularly diligent in insuring that the TASS service was careful to 
provide data on all hedge funds that stopped reporting during the time period covered by our 
study. 
Persistence in Hedge Fund Returns 
  Financial consultants characteristically calculate the past investment returns for different 
hedge fund managers in the belief that past investment success will be a good predictor of future 
success.  We test this hypothesis by asking if winners tend to repeat their success in the 
subsequent year.  We call a “winner” a hedge fund manager who realizes a return larger than the 
median hedge fund return.  A “loser” has realized a below median return.  Taking the previous 
year’s winners (156 in 1995), we then ask whether these funds were winners or losers in 1996.  It 
turns out that about 51 percent (80) of the previous year’s winners did repeat in 1996.  But about 
49 percent (76) have below average performance.  Performing a Z-test for significance of repeat 
winning, we find the difference is not significant.  Similar results hold over the entire 1996-2003 
period.  Indeed, the probability of observing repeat winners over the entire period is basically 50-
50.  Exhibit 9 presents the results.  
 
 [Insert Exhibit 9:  Persistence in Hedge Fund Returns, 1996-2003] 
 
     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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In the analysis reported in Panel A, we have assumed that any fund that stopped reporting 
was a loser.  It is, of course, possible that funds cease reporting because they do not wish to 
attract new investments.  Thus, in the bottom panel of the Table we do not count funds dropped 
from the data base as either winners or losers.  We find somewhat more persistence 
(approximately 55 percent of winners repeat) but the results (and significance) vary considerably 
year by year.  We believe, however, that larger funds are more likely to survive and that poor 
performance is the reason that funds drop from the data base.  We undertake a probit analysis 
below in an attempt to measure the major determinants of survival and to support this assertion. 
We can also examine whether more persistence can be shown if we look only at top 
quartile performers in our data base.  In this test we ask if a fund that was a top quartile 
performer in one year is more likely that not to have a better than average performer in the 
subsequent year.  Exhibit 10 shows than when funds leaving the data base are considered losers, 
the probability of a top quartile fund in one year being better than average in the next year is only 
50 percent.
6 
  We have also examined persistence by category of fund.  Exhibit 11 presents the data.  
We note that there is little difference in persistence by category.  The Equity Market Neutral 
category showed the most persistence (61 percent of winners repeat).  But in analyzing yearly 
data we find that in only one year during the 1996-2003 period was the persistence statistically 
significant.  
 
[Insert Exhibit 10:  Persistence of Top Quartile Hedge Fund Performers 1996-2003] 
                                                                 
6 We did test whether the probability of a top quartile performer remaining in the top quartile next year was greater 
than 25 percent.  Here, we could confirm some persistence since about one third of the top quartile performers ended 
up in top quartile in the following year. 
     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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[Insert Exhibit 11] 
 
  Past studies tend to find slightly more persistence than are reported above.  For example, 
Agarwal and Naik (2000) examine data from Hedge Fund Research (HFR) from January 1994 to 
December 1998.  They argue that HFR provides data on over 1,000 living and dead hedge funds 
and does not suffer from survivorship bias.  The authors measure a hedge fund’s alpha as the 
return from the hedge fund minus the average return for all hedge funds following the same 
strategy.  Parametric and non-parametric tests were performed to test for quarterly performance 
persistence.  They find reasonable amounts of persistence from quarter to quarter.  However, the 
HFR data base is known to have a lower attrition rate and include far fewer failed funds than 
other data bases.  Moreover, the authors state that the persistence they find is mainly driven by 
losers being followed by losers rather than winners repeating. 
The Non-Normality of Returns 
  The distribution of hedge fund returns and their distinctly non-normal characteristics 
have been widely described in the literature.  For example, Brooks and Kat (2001) have found 
that the published hedge fund indexes exhibit relatively low skewness (S) and high kurtosis (K).  
This is important for investors.  Scott and Horvath (1980) have shown that under very weak 
assumptions with respect to investors’ utility functions, investors will prefer high odd moments 
(mean and skewness) and low even moments (standard deviation and kurtosis). High skewness  
implies that the distribution of returns is asymmetric with the mean return greater than the     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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median return.
7  Kurtosis measures the weight of the tails of the returns distribution.  High 
kurtosis indicates that the distribution has “fat” tails.  A normal distribution will have a skewness 
of zero and a kurtosis of 3.  Exhibit 12 below shows the standard deviation, skewness, and 
kurtosis for the various hedge fund categories.  The Standard and Poor’s 500 stock index is  
 
 
 [Insert Exhibit 12:  Descriptive Statistics for Various Hedge Fund Categories 1995 – 2003] 
 
 
included to show how these higher moments compare with those from general equity 
investments.  While hedge funds do exhibit lower standard deviations than equities, and some 
categories have somewhat better Sharpe ratios than the S&P 500 stock index, we confirm that 
hedge fund returns are characterized by undesirably high kurtosis and that many hedge fund 
categories have considerable negative skewness. 
  We also undertake the Jarque-Bera
8 (J-B) test of the normality of hedge fund returns.  
This is a test of the joint hypothesis that S and K are 0 and 3, respectively.  The J-B test uses a 
chi-squared distribution with two degrees of freedom and its statistic is given by:  










2 2 K S
n  
where n denotes the number of observations, S is the skewness coefficient, and K is the kurtosis 
coefficient.  The J-B test statistic is reported on the last column of Exhibit 11.  With the 
                                                                 
7 Lu and Mulvey (2001) find that hedge funds with positive skewness (since they are more desirable) do tend to 
have lower rates of return. 
8 See C.M. Jarque and A.K. Bera, “A Test for Normality of Observations and Regression Residuals,” International 
Statistical Review, v. 55, 1987, pp. 163-172.     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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exception of the fund categories “Managed Futures” and “Dedicated Short Bias,” the hypothesis 
of normality is rejected for all the hedge fund categories.  
Cross-Sectional Variance and Results for Funds of Funds 
  Investors need also to be concerned about the cross-sectional distribution of returns.  
While the distribution of returns over time is clearly important, so is the risk that the investor 
chooses a particularly poorly performing hedge fund or fund of hedge funds.  Of course, the 
same kind of risk occurs in selecting active equity managers.  Thus, we will compare the cross-
sectional deviations for all general equity funds as well as for the various categories of hedge 
funds.  Exhibit 13 below displays the results. 
 
[Insert Exhibit 13:  Cross-Sectional Standard Deviations by Categories of Funds 1996 – 2003] 
 
  We note that the cross-sectional standard deviation of hedge fund returns is considerably 
higher than is the case for the mutual fund universe.  Even the fund of funds category generally 
displays as high a variance as exists for the entire mutual fund universe.  One cannot eliminate 
the risk of picking a poorly performing hedge fund by buying a diversified fund of funds. 
  Another way of looking at the cross-sectional variation among hedge-fund returns is to 
examine the differentials between first quartile and third quartile performance.  Exhibit 14 
presents the results.  In the exhibit we look at the returns of the funds at the bottom of the first 
and third quartiles when funds are arrayed by average performance over the five-year period 
from January 1999 through December 2003 and the ten-year period to December 2003.  Note 
that for bond funds and real estate funds there is very little difference between first and third 
quartile performance.  Even for equity funds the differences are relatively modest.  For hedge     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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funds, however, the differences are very large.  Moreover, the minimum returns (even allowing 
for the fact that there is considerable end-of-life bias in the data) are extremely unfavorable.  
Clearly, there is a risk in investing in hedge funds that is far greater than the risk of investing in 
the other asset classes covered in the Exhibit.  Of course, it is also the case that the rewards from 
selecting the top performing hedge fund are extremely large as well.  This explains why some 
institutional investors have enjoyed quite satisfactory returns from investing in hedge funds. 
 
 [Insert Exhibit 14:  Asset Returns by Quartile] 
 
Probit Analysis of the Probability of Fund Survival 
  We can observe from Exhibit 5 that a substantial proportion of the hedge funds in 
existence during the late 1990s failed to survive until April 2004.  On average, well over 10 
percent of all hedge funds die in each year, by which we mean that they stop reporting to the 
TASS data base service.  The attrition rates each year are shown in Exhibit 15.  In the exhibit, we 
compare hedge fund attrition rates to the attrition rates for mutual funds.  We find that hedge 
fund attrition rates are usually three or four times greater and the differences are highly 
significant.   
In this section, we undertake a probit regression analysis to examine the factors that 
contribute to the probability of a fund’s survival, and, by implication, factors that explain its 
demise.   In this analysis, the dependent variable is binary, taking a value of zero if a fund is dead 
and a value of one if it is still alive; as a consequence, in this probit analysis we are explaining 
the probability of a fund’s survival.  The explanatory variables include:      Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
   
  19 
(a) The fund’s return in each quarter for the most recent four quarters; they are included as 
four separate variables.  For a fund that died, the most recent quarters are those prior to the 
period it stopped reporting to the TASS database service.  We expect that hedge funds are more 
likely to die if they have produced low recent returns. 
(b) The standard deviation of the fund’s return for the most recent year.  A higher 
variability of returns is expected to decrease the probability of fund survival. 
 
 
 [Insert Exhibit 15: Comparison of Hedge Fund Attrition to Mutual Fund Attrition] 
 
 
(c) The fund’s most recent performance relative to all other funds, which is proxied by the 
number of times in the final three months the fund’s monthly return falls below the monthly 
median return of all hedge funds.  Good relative performance should increase a fund’s 
probability of survival. 
(d) The fund’s size, which is captured by the fund’s estimated assets, in billions of dollars, 
in the most recent month.  The larger the size of the fund, ceteris paribus, the more likely we 
expect it is to survive. 
For a fund that died, the most recent quarter or year simply means the period before the 
fund stopped reporting to the TASS database.   
The results of the probit analysis are presented in Exhibit 16.  The coefficient estimates 
suggest that a fund’s performance in the most recent quarters is an important determinant of the 
fund’s probability of survival.  The coefficient estimate for returns relative to peers is statistically 
insignificant. Secondly, higher volatility of return (in the most recent year) has a negative impact 
on a fund’s survival probability: the coefficient estimate of the variable, ‘standard deviation of     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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the fund’s return for the most recent year’ is negative and highly significant.  The probit results 
also suggest that larger funds have a higher probability of survival: the estimated coefficient of 
the variable ‘estimated assets’ is positive and significant.  Referring back to our discussion of the 
results reported in Table 9, it would appear that funds that stop reporting to the TASS data base 
are likely to be “losers” rather than funds that became sufficiently large that they no longer 
wished to attract new funds. 
 
[Insert Exhibit 16:  Probit Regression]  
 
Analysis of Survival Time Analysis for Hedge Funds 
In the probit analysis we examined a fund’s probability of survival.  Here we want to 
examine a fund’s time to survival, that is, the duration of a fund.  Duration is defined as the time 
until failure. For dead funds, this is the time from inception to failure and for funds still alive, 
duration time is considered truncated since failure has not yet occurred.   
Duration data models have been applied extensively to economic and financial analysis in 
recent years. A few examples of such applications include the length of unemployment 
(Lancaster, 1979) or welfare spells (Blank, 1989); job duration (Gronberg, 1994)); the length of 
time firms remain in Chapter 11 protection (Bandopadhaya, 1994); and the duration of marketing 
time of residential housing (Haurin, 1988). Kiefer (1988) and Lancaster (1990) provide excellent 
reviews and numerous other examples.   
Central to duration analysis is the survivor function: 
S(t)  =  Pr(T ‡ t )                  Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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which gives the probability that the random variable T, denoting duration, will equal or exceed 
the value t.  A particularly useful concept in duration analysis is the hazard function: 
 








=-=- ,           
 
which, loosely defined for the purposes of this paper, is the rate at which a fund dies at duration 
t, given that it has lasted until t. Thus, the hazard function describes how the rate of failure 
changes over time. A monotonically increasing (decreasing) hazard function, for example, 
implies positive duration dependence; in other words, the likelihood of failure increases 
(decreases) with time.  However, in many applications hazard functions can be non-monotonic 
and can be, for example, U-shaped or inverted U-shaped. 
  A priori one would expect the hazard function for hedge funds’ survival time to be 
inverted U-shaped.  This shape would imply that a fund is unlikely to fail right after inception; if 
failure occurs, it is likely to occur in the first few years of operation; however, once a fund has 
survived the first years and has established a track record, its likelihood of failure should decline 
over time.   
  Exhibit 17 graphs the hazard functions for the hedge funds in our dataset using the 
lognormal distribution.  The estimated hazard function  does show an inverted U -shape, 
confirming our a priori expectation about its shape.
9 Exhibit 17 shows that the failure rate 
increases for the first year, reaches its peak in the 11
th month, and then steadily declines over 
time.  This analysis suggests that the first few years of its existence are critical for a fund’s 
                                                                 
9 The functional form of the lognormal hazard implies an inverted U-shape.  By contrast, the generalized gamma 
distribution is extremely flexible and can accommodate a wide variety of hazard function shapes.  In this paper, the 
hazard function was also estimated using the generalized gamma distribution and the inverted U-shape was 
corroborated by this more flexible functional form.  However, based on the Akaike’s Information Criterion we 
rejected the generalized gamma in favor of the lognormal distribution.  
     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
   
  22 
survival—if failure occurs, it is most likely to occur in these years.  However, the rate of failure 
(i.e., the hazard rate) stays fairly high for a protracted period of time: between month 12 (when 
hazard rate reaches its peak) and month 36.  During this period, the failure rate drops only by 
about 18 percent.  
  Exhibit 18 contains the results of the duration analysis using  the same  explanatory 
variables employed in the probit analysis. This analysis examines the role of various factors  
 
 [Insert Exhibit 17:  Lognormal Hazard Function] 
 
[Insert Exhibit 18:  Survival Time Regression] 
 
influencing the survival time of hedge funds.
10  Qualitatively, the results of the probit (survival 
probability) and duration (survival time) analysis are essentially the same, with one exception.  
In the duration time analysis, the estimated coefficient of the variable ‘peer comparison’ (which 
is the number of times in the final three months the fund’s monthly return falls below the 
monthly median return of all hedge funds) is negative and statistically significant.  This result 
suggests  that  a fund’s survival time is shortened if it performs worse than its peers.  The 
coefficient estimates of the remaining variables all have the expected signs.   
The Fund of Funds Category 
  The product usually marketed to wealthy individual investors is called a Fund of Funds.  
Like a mutual fund that holds a diversified portfolio of individual equities or bonds, the Fund of 
                                                                 
10 We report the results using the lognormal distribution; the results using the generalized distribution are similar. 
     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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Funds holds a diversified portfolio of hedge funds.  The fund of funds manager will often claim 
that the manager can select the best hedge funds for inclusion in the portfolio. 
The performance of different Funds of Funds is examined in Exhibit 19.  Here, we 
compare the mean return for the Hedge Fund universe with the mean Fund of Funds return.  We 
note that whether backfilled returns are included or not, and whether dead funds are included or 
excluded, the mean Fund of Funds return is considerably lower than is the case for the Hedge 
Fund universe.  Clearly, the typical Fund of Funds is not able to select the best performing 
individual Hedge Funds.  Returns are lower for the Fund of Funds category because investors in 
such portfolios of funds are paying two sets of management fees—one to the Hedge Fund 
manager and another to the Fund of Funds portfolio manager.  
 
[Insert Exhibit 19:  Analysis of Fund of Funds Category] 
 
Hedge Funds and Portfolio Diversification 
  Perhaps the most frequently made and certainly the strongest argument for the inclusion 
of hedge funds in an investment portfolio is that they represent an asset class that is uncorrelated 
with equity investments.  For example, Exhibit 20 shows that the various hedge fund categories 
have very low covariance with the S&P 500 when both hedge fund returns and the S&P are 
measured contemporaneously.  CAPM Betas are very low, measuring 0.231 for the hedge fund 
universe.  The equity market neutral category does indeed have a Beta that is essentially zero and 
the “short bias” category has a Beta of approximately minus one.  With such low measured 
Betas, hedge funds appear to produce positive alphas, i.e., positive risk adjusted performance.     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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  Measured Betas may be downwardly biased, however, if, as is likely to be the case, 
hedge fund returns are based on nonsynchronous prices.  Many hedge funds hold a variety of 
illiquid and difficult to price securities and derivative instruments.  For the purpose of monthly 
reporting, hedge fund valuation can often be based on recent and estimated prices, rather than 
prices that are perfectly synchronous with those stocks comprising the S&P 500 stock index.  
Any lack of synchronicity or “management” of reported returns can lead to biased measures of 
market exposure. 
  One technique that has frequently been used to determine a more accurate measure of 
true Betas is to introduce lags in the estimation process to capture the possibility that hedge fund 
valuations may be based on stale prices.
11  We run regressions of excess hedge fund returns  
 
 
[Insert Exhibit 20:  Unadjusted and Adjusted Beta Estimates for Hedge Fund Categories] 
 
 
against not simply contemporaneous excess stock market returns but also on lagged excess stock 
returns of the following form. 
,,1,,,1,,1,12,,2,23,,3,3, ()()()()() itFtoiMtFtiMtFtiMtFtiMtFtit RRRRRRRRRR abbbbe ------ -=+-+-+-+-+  
We then calculate the summed Beta  0123 () bbbb +++  to obtain a true representation of the 
hedge fund’s true Beta with respect to the stock market index.  Exhibit 19 presents the results in 
                                                                 
11 See, for example, Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979) as well as Asness, Krail and Liew (2001) who 
have used the technique to estimate hedge fund Betas. 
 
     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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column (4).  Adjusted Betas are considerably higher for the hedge fund universe and increase 
from 0.231 to 0.393.   
  Over our sample period 1996-2003, the risk-free rate averaged about 4 percent and the 
S&P 500 return was 9.4 percent.  Using our adjusted Beta, the CAPM equation would then 
predict a hedge fund return of 6.1 percent. 
ˆ 6.14.00.39(9.44.0) H R ==+-  
Since the actual return of the hedge fund universe was 9.3 percent, we can say that hedge funds 
did produce a positive alpha, but one much smaller than those that are obtained using unadjusted 
Betas. 
Concluding Comments 
  Hedge funds have attracted close to a trillion dollars of investment capital, with most of 
the growth occurring during the early 2000s.  They have been marketed as an asset class that has 
provided generous returns during all stock market environments and thus as excellent diversifiers 
to an all equity portfolio. 
  In this study, we have shown that reported hedge fund results are substantially upward 
biased.  The practice of voluntary reporting (and backfilling only favorable past results) causes 
some reported hedge fund indexes to be substantially upward biased.  Moreover, the substantial 
attrition that characterizes the hedge fund industry results in substantial survivorship bias in the 
returns of indexes composed of any currently existing funds.  Correcting for such bias we find 
that hedge funds have lower returns and are riskier than is commonly supposed.  Moreover, the 
reported low correlations of hedge fund returns with standard equity indexes is at least in part an 
artifact of hedge fund asset pricing that may sometimes rely on stale or managed prices.  Even     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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after correcting for such bias, however, hedge funds do appear to offer investors an asset class 
that is less than perfectly correlated with standard equity indexes. 
  Nevertheless, hedge funds have been shown to be extremely risky in another dimension.  
The cross-sectional variation and the range of individual hedge fund returns are far greater than 
is the case for traditional asset classes.  Investors in hedge funds take on a substantial risk of 
selecting a very poorly performing fund or worse, a failing one.  The industry is characterized by 
substantial numbers of failures.  Moreover, while selection risk can be somewhat mitigated by 
investing in a diversified “fund of funds,” we have shown that these diversified funds perform 
much less well than the industry as a whole. 
  Finally, we must wonder whether the substantial flow of funds into the hedge fund 
industry will tend to reduce returns significantly in the future.  When only a limited amount of 
capital is pursuing arbitrage opportunities between about to merged corporations or between 
different securities of an individual company, even believers in reasonably efficient markets can 
image that limited profit opportunities may exist.  But as enormous streams of investment funds 
enter the field, it is reasonable to assume that such opportunities will be attenuated.  Thus, the 
very success of the hedge fund industry in attracting funds is likely to make hedge fund investing 
a less profitable investment strategy in the future. 
     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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Exhibit 1 
 
Growth of Hedge Fund Assets 
 
The exhibit shows the growth of money invested in hedge funds from 1988 through 2004 
  Source: Van Hedge Fund Advisors, International and authors’ estimates 
 
     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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Exhibit 2 
 
Categories of Hedge Funds 
 
The exhibit shows the distribution of the number of hedge funds across TASS style categories in
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Exhibit 3  
 
Global Hedge Fund Net Returns
 
January 1, 1988 – December 31, 2003 
The exhibit shows hedge fund returns from 1988 through 2003, as estimated by one data 






















































Source: Van Hedge Fund Advisors     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation.    
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Exhibit 4 
Backfill Bias in Hedge Funds Returns 1994 – 2003 
This table compares the backfilled returns in the TASS data base with those returns that were contemporaneously reported. 
  Backfilled    Non Backfilled        
  Mean Return  Count    Mean Return  Count    Difference  T Stat   
1994  0.39%  1076    -10.81%  22    11.20%  (3.00)   
1995  17.98%  1318    11.75%  312    6.23%  (5.13)   
1996  19.38%  1298    14.79%  604    4.59%  (4.81)   
1997  20.10%  1306    14.05%  786    6.04%  (6.23)   
1998  9.68%  1351    -0.56%  1034    10.25%  (10.32)   
1999  28.90%  1407    29.18%  1177    -0.28%  0.18    
2000  14.16%  1462    3.89%  1293    10.28%  (10.98)   
2001  7.91%  1521    3.95%  1971    3.96%  (6.48)   
2002  4.93%  949    1.47%  2282    3.46%  (6.84)   
2003  19.43%  936    16.76%  2700    2.67%  (1.88)   
Average  14.29%      8.45%      5.84%  (5.55)   
                  
  Backfilled    Non Backfilled        
  Median  Count    Median  Count    Difference  Z-Stat  Probability 
1994  -0.08%  1076    -8.16%  22    8.08%  (3.26)  0.0006 
1995  15.92%  1318    11.75%  312    4.17%  (6.20)  <0.0001 
1996  17.51%  1298    14.21%  604    3.30%  (7.13)  <0.0001 
1997  17.52%  1306    14.21%  786    3.31%  (7.59)  <0.0001 
1998  7.75%  1351    2.01%  1034    5.75%  (11.74)  <0.0001 
1999  23.60%  1407    18.76%  1177    4.86%  (2.71)  0.0034 
2000  11.60%  1462    6.87%  1293    4.73%  (11.10)  <0.0001 
2001  6.50%  1521    4.63%  1971    1.87%  8.10  <0.0001 
2002  3.12%  949    1.76%  2282    1.36%  7.12  <0.0001 
2003  14.90%  936    12.55%  2700    2.35%  6.82   <0.0001 
Average  11.83%      7.86%      3.98%  (2.77)   
Source: TASS Database     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation.    
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Exhibit 5 
Survivorship Bias in Hedge Fund Returns, 1996 - 2003 
                           
This table compares the returns of hedge funds still existing with those funds that left the data base at any time during the 1996-
2003 period.  Backfilled returns are not included in this analysis.  Live/Dead Status determined as of April 2004.  The bottom 
panel presents the comparison of live funds against all funds, live and dead. 
 
                           
    LIVE    DEAD           
Year    Mean Return    Count    Mean Return    Count    Difference    T-Stat   
1996    17.23%    124    12.50%    480    4.72%    2.69    
1997    19.28%    221    11.23%    565    8.05%    4.97    
1998    1.35%    346    -3.46%    688    4.80%    2.91    
1999    34.86%    487    24.97%    690    9.89%    3.92    
2000    9.14%    649    -3.85%    644    12.99%    10.69    
2001    5.63%    1245    -1.85%    726    7.48%    9.90    
2002    2.75%    1705    -3.15%    577    5.90%    8.05    
2003    17.35%    2343    11.97%    357    5.37%    5.33    
Arithmetic Average  13.45%        6.05%        7.40%    6.06    
Geometric Average  12.99%        5.59%               
                           
    LIVE    LIVE + DEAD           
Year    Mean Return    Count    Mean Return    Count    Difference       
1996    17.23%    124    13.47%    604    3.75%       
1997    19.28%    221    13.49%    786    5.79%       
1998    1.35%    346    -1.85%    1034    3.19%       
1999    34.86%    487    29.06%    1177    5.80%       
2000    9.14%    649    2.67%    1293    6.47%       
2001    5.63%    1245    2.87%    1971    2.76%       
2002    2.75%    1705    1.26%    2282    1.49%       
2003    17.35%    2343    16.64%    2700    0.71%       
Arithmetic Average  13.45%        9.70%        3.75%       
Geometric Average  12.99%        9.29%                   Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
   
  35 
Exhibit 6 
 
Comparison of Hedge Fund Returns 
1995 – 2003 
 
This table presents the net compounded annual returns of aggregate indices constructed from 






      
      
     TASS - backfill included  TASS – backfill excluded                  
      
 
LIVE+DEAD  LIVE  LIVE+DEAD    LIVE  CSFB/Tremont  Van Hedge    HFR 
 
  
                            
   AVERAGE    12.21%  13.75%  9.29%    13.14%  12.62%  13.61%    13.44%     
                                 
 
     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation.    
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Exhibit 7 
Survivorship Bias in Mutual Fund Returns, 1996 - 2003 
                   
This table presents the mean return and count of annualized mutual fund returns categorized by their Live/Dead status.  This 
sample includes all general equity funds as reported by Lipper.  A fund is categorized as live if it has reported returns as of 
December 2003.  The bottom panel presents the comparison of live funds against all funds, live and dead. 
                   
    LIVE    DEAD       
Year     Mean Return  Count    Mean Return  Count    Difference  T-Stat 
1996    16.42%  2328    13.32%  1286    3.10%  10.32  
1997    18.09%  3123    11.03%  1520    7.05%  14.12  
1998    11.41%  3691    4.77%  1705    6.64%  13.32  
1999    33.01%  4173    32.08%  1709    0.93%  0.90  
2000    -2.28%  4944    -10.17%  1852    7.89%  16.89  
2001    -11.26%  5965    -16.52%  1713    5.26%  13.68  
2002    -19.46%  7006    -23.58%  1362    4.12%  11.71  
2003    31.92%  8416    30.64%  754    1.28%  3.55  
Arithmetic Mean    9.73%      5.20%      4.53%  10.56  
                   
    LIVE    LIVE + DEAD       
Year     Mean Return  Count    Mean Return  Count    Difference   
1996    16.42%  2328    15.32%  3614    1.10%   
1997    18.09%  3123    15.78%  4643    2.31%   
1998    11.41%  3691    9.31%  5396    2.10%   
1999    33.01%  4173    32.74%  5882    0.27%   
2000    -2.28%  4944    -4.43%  6796    2.15%   
2001    -11.26%  5965    -12.43%  7678    1.17%   
2002    -19.46%  7006    -20.13%  8368    0.67%   
2003    31.92%  8416    31.81%  9170    0.11%   
Arithmetic Mean    9.73%      8.49%      1.23%   
     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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Exhibit 8 
Survivorship Bias by Primary Category 
1996 - 2003 
 
This table presents compound annual returns of hedge fund categories by Live/Dead status.  This 
sample includes non-backfilled data from 1996 through 2003. 
 
 
                       
     LIVE + DEAD  LIVE  DEAD   
Difference 
LIVE vs. DEAD    
  Convertible Arbitrage  10.54%  11.53%  6.79%    4.74%    
  Dedicated Short Bias  1.75%  2.65%  0.45%    2.20%    
  Emerging Markets  13.32%  20.69%  5.45%    15.24%    
  Equity Market Neutral  5.46%  6.84%  3.51%    3.33%    
  Event Driven  9.25%  11.40%  5.57%    5.83%    
  Fixed Income Arbitrage  7.38%  9.43%  4.29%    5.15%    
  Fund of Funds  7.14%  8.00%  5.45%    2.55%    
  Global Macro  7.48%  13.14%  -1.83%    14.97%    
  Long/Short Equity Hedge  10.71%  13.03%  7.06%    5.97%    
  Managed Futures  7.07%  11.42%  3.86%    7.55%    
  Other/Default  10.51%  11.94%  8.27%    3.67%    
                           Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation.    
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Exhibit 9 
Persistence in Hedge Fund Returns, 1996 - 2003 
                       
This table presents tests of persistence in hedge fund returns.  This analysis includes non-backfilled returns from 1996 through 
2003.  In Panel A, funds that stopped reporting are considered losers.  In Panel B, funds that stopped reporting are not included in 
the analysis.  The Z-test determines the significance of the persistence against a Chi-square distribution of fifty percent. 
                       
Panel A:  Dropped Funds Are Considered Losers.                      
                         
Year    Winner-Winner    Winner-Loser    Total    % Repeat Winner    Z-test Repeat Winner    
1996    80    76    156    51.28%    0.3     
1997    163    139    302    53.97%    1.4     
1998    214    179    393    54.45%    1.8     
1999    232    285    517    44.87%    (2.3)    
2000    235    354    589    39.90%    (4.9)    
2001    403    244    647    62.29%    6.3     
2002    539    447    986    54.67%    2.9     
2003    447    694    1141    39.18%    (7.3)    
                 50.08%    (0.2)    
                                   
                       
                                   
Panel B:  Dropped Funds Are Not Considered in This Analysis.            
Year    Winner-Winner    Winner-Loser    Total    % Repeat Winner    Z-test Repeat Winner    
1996    80    65    145    55.17%    1.2     
1997    163    115    278    58.63%    2.9     
1998    214    158    372    57.53%    2.9     
1999    232    250    482    48.13%    (0.8)    
2000    235    292    527    44.59%    (2.5)    
2001    403    202    605    66.61%    8.2     
2002    539    354    893    60.36%    6.2     
2003    447    605    1052    42.49%    (4.9)    
                 54.19%    1.7         Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation.    
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Exhibit 10 
Persistence of Top Quartile Hedge Fund Performers 
1996 - 2003 
 
The exhibit examines how the previous year’s top quartile performers performed in the subsequent year.  The analysis includes non-
backfilled returns from 1996 through 2003.  Funds that stopped reporting are considered losers. 
 
                                      
   Year    Winner-Winner    Winner-Loser    Total    %Repeat Winner    Z-test Repeat Winners    
   1996    39    39    78    50.00%    0.00     
   1997    86    65    151    56.95%    1.71     
   1998    95    102    197    48.22%    (0.50)    
   1999    131    128    259    50.58%    0.19     
   2000    84    210    294    28.57%    (7.35)    
   2001    188    135    323    58.20%    2.95     
   2002    297    195    492    60.37%    4.60     
   2003    260    310    570    45.61%    (2.09)    
                   49.81%    (0.06)    
                                      
     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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Exhibit 11 
   Persistence in Hedge Fund Returns by Category of Fund, 1996 - 2003   
 
This table presents the percentage of repeat winners in each category.  The figures in the table are an  
average of yearly repeat winner percentages for each category.  Backfilled returns are not included in this 
analysis.  Dropped funds are considered losers. 
 
              
    Type of Fund    % Repeat Winner    
            
           
   Convertible Arbitrage    54.60    
           
   Dedicated Short Bias    35.04    
           
   Emerging Markets    48.27    
           
   Equity Market Neutral    61.26    
           
   Event Driven    55.71    
           
   Fixed Income Arbitrage    55.64    
           
   Fund of Funds    51.74    
           
   Global Macro    41.13    
           
   Long/Short Equity    51. 67    
           
   Managed Futures    42.41    
           
   Other    52.08    
              
          
  
      Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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Exhibit 12 
Descriptive Statistics for Various 
Hedge Fund Categories 
1995 - 2003 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for each of the hedge fund categories and other benchmark 
indexes.  Backfilled data are excluded and both live and dead funds are included.  The J-B statistic 
tests the joint hypothesis that S=0 and K=3. 
 
Note: 
The J-B Test statistic is distributed as chi-squared, with 2 degrees of freedom.  Asterisk indicates that 
hypothesis of normality cannot be rejected at the 5% level.  (Critical value = 5.99)     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation.    
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Exhibit 13 
Cross-Sectional Standard Deviations by Categories of Funds  
1996 – 2003 
 
This table presents the cross-sectional standard deviation of returns for each category in the hedge fund universe.  This sample includes 
non-backfilled returns from 1996 through 2003 for both live and dead funds.  Each yearly figure represents the average of monthly 
cross-sectional standard deviation for each category.  The final average figure is the average of all the yearly cross-sectional standard 
deviations. 
 
                                   
                     YEARLY    
      1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  AVERAGE    
   Convertible Arbitrage  1.62%  2.01%  2.43%  2.10%  2.73%  2.11%  1.97%  1.65%  2.08%    
   Dedicated Short Bias  5.27%  3.84%  7.06%  5.84%  5.18%  6.68%  3.70%  2.85%  5.05%    
   Emerging Markets  5.89%  6.22%  9.82%  8.63%  7.30%  5.45%  5.30%  4.59%  6.65%    
   Equity Markets Neutral  2.88%  2.48%  3.32%  3.13%  3.20%  3.45%  2.69%  2.43%  2.95%    
   Event Driven  4.33%  2.85%  3.71%  3.69%  4.48%  3.37%  2.71%  2.28%  3.43%    
   Fixed Income Arbitrage  1.96%  1.85%  4.32%  2.26%  3.36%  3.38%  3.14%  1.79%  2.76%    
   Fund of Funds  3.22%  3.84%  4.61%  4.04%  4.20%  2.45%  2.02%  1.91%  3.29%    
   Global Macro  5.17%  5.43%  7.78%  4.90%  5.72%  5.79%  4.67%  4.38%  5.48%    
   Long/Short Bias Hedge  5.44%  5.28%  6.78%  7.19%  8.57%  5.98%  4.28%  3.49%  5.88%    
   Managed Futures  8.65%  6.98%  6.25%  6.14%  6.53%  4.78%  6.33%  5.21%  6.36%    
   Other  2.86%  3.96%  5.62%  5.04%  4.56%  3.67%  4.20%  4.46%  4.29%    
   Hedge Fund Universe  5.82%  5.39%  7.04%  6.36%  6.83%  5.17%  4.26%  3.58%  5.56%    
   Mutual Fund Universe  2.53%  2.74%  3.11%  3.87%  5.48%  3.85%  3.05%  2.09%  3.34%    
                                   
     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation.    
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Exhibit 14 
Asset Returns by Quartile 
This table presents a comparison of the differences between the bottoms of the first and third quartile returns for various investment 
categories.  The top panel presents the variation over the five years ending December 2003.  The bottom panel presents the variation 
over the 10 years ending December 2003.   
 
         5 Years Ending 12/31/2003          
     Max (%)  1st Quartile (%)  Median (%)  3rd Quartile (%)  Min (%) 
Range of 1st-3rd 
Quartiles    
   US Fixed Income  9.3  7.2  6.9  6.5  3.8  0.7    
   US Equity  11.3  4.2  1.2  -0.4  -5.1  4.6    
   International Equity  21.9  8.0  4.0  1.5  -5.8  6.6    
   Real Estate  10.2  9.9  9.2  8.2  7.3  1.8    
   Hedge Funds  160.2  11.1  4.0  -4.5  -79.3  15.6    
                         
                 
                 
     
         10 Years Ending 12/31/2003          
     Max (%)  1st Quartile (%)  Median (%)  3rd Quartile (%)  Min (%) 
Range of 1st-3rd 
Quartiles    
   US Fixed Income  8.4  7.4  7.2  7.0  6.0  0.5    
   US Equity  17.6  12.6  11.7  11.2  6.9  1.4    
   International Equity  12.5  9.3  7.0  5.2  2.1  4.1    
   Real Estate  12.9  11.3  10.4  9.5  9.0  1.8    
   Hedge Funds  236.8  14.6  6.0  -2.1  -85.5  16.7    
                         
                 
     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation.    
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Exhibit 15 
Comparison of Hedge Fund Attrition to Mutual Fund Attrition 
                             
    Hedge Fund Attrition (TASS database)    Mutual Fund Attrition   
Year    Existing    Exiting    Attrition    Existing    Exiting    Attrition    Chi-Square 
                             
1994    22    3    13.64%    2,407    61    2.53%    10.47 
1995    312    30    9.62%    3,037    152    5.00%    11.70 
1996    604    89    14.74%    3,614    139    3.85%    120.00 
1997    786    86    10.94%    4,643    188    4.05%    66.63 
1998    1,034    154    14.89%    5,396    281    5.21%    129.07 
1999    1,177    176    14.95%    5,882    319    5.42%    136.60 
2000    1,293    229    17.71%    6,796    521    7.67%    130.29 
2001    1,971    265    13.44%    7,678    597    7.78%    61.97 
2002    2,282    261    11.44%    8,368    663    7.92%    27.95 
2003    2,700    378    14.00%    9,170    752    8.20%    81.44 
                             
Note:  Backfilled returns were excluded from the dataset.  Therefore, only funds reporting contemporaneously were considered.   
     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation.    





Explained Variable: Probability of Fund Survival 
 
 
The regression explains probability that a hedge fund will survive.  The explanatory variables are described below. 
                 
  Explanatory Variables    Coefficient    Std Dev    z    P>|z|   
[1]  Quarter 1    1.21     0.39     3.10     0.00    
[2]  Quarter 2    4.40     0.35     12.53     0.00    
[3]  Quarter 3    3.46     0.37     9.45     0.00    
[4]  Quarter 4    2.02     0.31     6.49     0.00    
[5]  Standard Deviation for final 12 months    (15.40)    0.96     (16.07)    0.00    
[6]  Peer Comparison    (0.05)    0.04     (1.41)    0.16    
[7]  Estimated Assets    0.91     0.19     4.87     0.00    
[8]  Constant    0.89     0.08     11.51     0.00    
                     
                     
                     
Explanation of Variables:              
[1]  Return for the first quarter before the end of fund performance (Months 1 - 3)           
[2]  Return for the second quarter before the end of fund performance (Months 4 - 6)       
[3]  Return for the third quarter before the end of fund performance (Months 7 - 9)       
[4]  Return for the fourth quarter before the end of fund performance (Months 10 - 12)       
[5]  Standard deviation for the year prior to the end of fund performance (Months 1 - 12)       
[6]  Number of times in the final 3 months the fund's monthly return falls below the monthly median of all funds   
[7]  Estimated assets of the fund at the end of performance.  If estimated assets are missing for the final month, the amount of 
estimated assets in the final four months is used as a substitute.  Estimated assets are in billions of dollars. 
 
     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation.    























Max = Month 11
 
Lognormal Hazard Function 
   The graph shows the rate at which a hedge fund dies given that it has lasted the number of months shown on the 
   horizontal axis.     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation.    
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Exhibit 18 
Survival Time Regression 
Duration Analysis - Lognormal 
                 
The regression explains the survival time for hedge funds.  The explanatory variables are described below. 
                 
  Explanatory Variables    Coefficient    Std Dev    z    P>|z|   
[1]  Quarter 1    0.24     0.20     1.19     0.24    
[2]  Quarter 2    1.19     0.20     6.08     0.00    
[3]  Quarter 3    1.40     0.18     7.89     0.00    
[4]  Quarter 4    0.88     0.16     5.38     0.00    
[5]  Standard Deviation for final 12 months    (3.41)    0.45     (7.53)    0.00    
[6]  Peer Comparison    (0.10)    0.03     (3.69)    0.00    
[7]  Estimated Assets    1.07     0.15     7.30     0.00    
[8]  Constant    4.37     0.06     74.99     0.00    
                     
                     
                     
Explanation of Variables:              
[1]  Return for the first quarter before the end of fund performance (Months 1 - 3)           
[2]  Return for the second quarter before the end of fund performance (Months 4 - 6)         
[3]  Return for the third quarter before the end of fund performance (Months 7 - 9)         
[4]  Return for the fourth quarter before the end of fund performance (Months 10 - 12)       
[5]  Standard deviation for the year prior to the end of fund performance (Months 1 - 12)       
[6]  Number of times in the final 3 months the fund's monthly return falls below the monthly median of all funds   
[7]  Estimated assets of the fund at the end of performance.  If estimated assets are missing for the final month, the amount of 
estimated assets in the final four months is used as a substitute.  Estimated assets are in billions of dollars. 
 
     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation. 
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Exhibit 19 
Analysis of Fund of Funds Category 
1996 - 2003 
                       
 The table shows the mean monthly return for the fund of funds category compared with the mean return for the 
hedge fund universe. 
                       
Backfill Excluded & Live + Dead 
                                   
  
Fund of Funds  Hedge Fund Universe      
   Mean  Stdev  Count    Mean  Stdev  Count    Difference  T-stat    
   0.50%  0.62%  375    0.75%  1.06%  1649    -0.25%  (5.97)    
                                   
                       
                       
Backfill Excluded & Live Only 
                                   
  
Fund of Funds  Hedge Fund Universe      
   Mean  Stdev  Count    Mean  Stdev  Count    Difference  T-stat    
   0.58%  0.47%  243    0.95%  0.87%  1034    -0.37%  (9.00)    
                                   
                       
                       
Backfill Included & Live + Dead 
                                   
  
Fund of Funds  Hedge Fund Universe      
   Mean  Stdev  Count    Mean  Stdev  Count    Difference  T-stat    
   0.62%  0.55%  610    0.98%  0.97%  2498    -0.36%  (12.04)    
                                   
                       
                       
Backfill Included & Live Only 
                                   
  
Fund of Funds  Hedge Fund Universe      
   Mean  Stdev  Count    Mean  Stdev  Count    Difference  T-stat    
   0.66%  0.43%  459    1.06%  0.88%  1860    -0.39%  (13.61)    
                                   
                       
           
     Preliminary Draft: Not for quotation or citation.    
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Exhibit 20 
Unadjusted and Adjusted Beta Estimates for Hedge Fund Categories 
The table shows adjusted and unadjusted beta estimates for various hedge fund categories.  Monthly individual excess hedge fund 
returns are regressed against the excess returns for the S&P 500 index.  The numbers shown for each category are the averages from 
























Convertible Arbitrage  84  6.84%  0.088  0.090  0.080  0.007  0.000  0.178  0.090 
Dedicated Short Bias  13  0.80%  (0.957)  (0.953)  (0.142)  0.047  (0.082)  (1.132)  (0.175) 
Emerging Markets  148  4.96%  0.641  0.657  0.214  0.003  (0.022)  0.852  0.211 
Equity Market Neutral  100  3.74%  (0.015)  (0.010)  0.012  0.035  0.005  0.043  0.057 
Event Driven  189  4.92%  0.179  0.182  0.112  0.044  0.027  0.365  0.185 
Fixed Income Arbitrage  80  3.07%  0.025  0.037  0.050  0.076  0.032  0.194  0.169 
Fund of Funds  375  2.06%  0.142  0.146  0.053  0.059  0.029  0.287  0.146 
Global Macro  92  1.71%  0.042  0.054  0.062  0.093  (0.006)  0.203  0.161 
Long/Short Equity Hedge  717  6.74%  0.422  0.425  0.114  0.057  0.047  0.642  0.220 
Managed Futures  183  2.35%  (0.154)  (0.152)  (0.044)  0.026  0.036  (0.133)  0.021 
Other/Default  43  3.79%  0.270  0.266  0.075  0.008  0.067  0.417  0.146 
Hedge Fund Universe  2024  3.68%  0.231  0.235  0.082  0.047  0.028  0.393  0.162 
 
 
 
 
 
 